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This paper develops a model of the term structure of credit spreads
on sovereign bonds that accommodates: (i) Default or repudiation: The
sovereign announces that it will stop making payments on its debt; (ii) Re-
structuring or renegotiation: The sovereign and the lenders \agree" to reduce
(or postpone) the remaining payments; and (iii) A \regime switch," such as a
change of government or the default of another sovereign bond that changes
the perceived risk of future defaults. We build on the framework of Due and
Singleton (1999), showing that cash flows promised by a sovereign bond can
be discounted using a default-adjusted short-term discount rate that reflects
the mean arrival rate, and associated losses in market value upon arrival, of
each of the aforementioned types of credit events. Since a sovereign credit
event is often not a \liquidation event," the model allows for continued trad-
ing (and pricing) of a sovereign instrument through credit events, possibly
after write-downs in face value or cash distributions to creditors on credit
event dates.
Additionally, we accommodate the possibility that bonds issued by the
same sovereign, of exactly the same type but possibly of dierent maturities,
may be priced in the market using dierent discount factors. Reasons for
this may include: (i) Bond covenants may not include cross-default clauses
that would force, upon the default of one bond, the simultaneous default
of other bonds of the same type, but of a dierent maturity. For various
strategic reasons related to internal or external political or economic con-
siderations, sovereign issuers may choose to default on, or to renegotiate,
the terms of one bond (or one set of bonds), but not on others. (ii) Some
sovereigns (such as Turkey and the Philippines) have issued Eurobonds gov-
erned by dierent legal systems (those of the U.K. and U.S.) that have dif-
ferent collective-action clauses and, hence, dier with respect to the ease of
creditor-initiated restructurings (Eichengreen and Mody (2000)). (iii) Por-
tions of the outstanding debt may have been issued during dierent political
regimes. In this situation, the current regime may feel, or be perceived to
feel, a stronger obligation to make contractual payments on debt issued dur-
ing its own regime. (iv) Finally, for these reasons and because of possible
clientele trading patterns, high transaction costs, or asymmetrically informed
traders (including government insiders), dierent bonds may have dierent
illiquidity.
As an illustration of our valuation framework, we estimate a model of
the term structure of credit spreads for bonds of the Russian Ministry of
Finance (MinFin) over a sample period encompassing the default on do-
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mestic Russian GKO bonds in August, 1998.1 For this purpose, our model
is parameterized with the composite credit-and-liquidity spread of one of
the Russian MinFins, serving as a \benchmark." All other MinFins are al-
lowed to have idiosyncratic components to their discount rates relative to this
benchmark. Importantly, these idiosyncratic factors enter directly into the
discount rates, rather than being treated as additive pricing or measurement
errors, as has become common practice in the literature on dynamic term
structure models.2 Initially, our model is estimated using data up to, but
not including the 1998 Russian default. Using the parameters and implied
spreads, we examine a variety of implications of the estimated model, includ-
ing the determinants of the spread, the degree of integration of the markets
for dierent Russian sovereign bonds, dierences in both the liquidities and
expected default recoveries of dierent bonds, and the implied expectations of
investors about dierent default scenarios. We also study the correlations of
these spreads with various macro-economic time series including the reserves
of the Russian Central Bank and the price of oil.
Identifying an econometric model of spreads with a sample period that
includes a major sovereign credit event is challenging, because such events are
rare | there is only one in our Russian sample! Moreover, as outlined above,
there may be eective reductions of principal due to the credit event that may
only be revealed at later dates, possibly as late as maturity. Our approach
to modeling \through a credit event" in Russia is decidedly pragmatic. We
extend our basic pricing framework, under admittedly strong independence
assumptions, to allow for the possibility that creditors do not know with cer-
tainty the implications of a credit event for the eventual write-down of the
bond. Instead, they formulate prices based on their expected write-down.
Then, through the pricing model, we are able to back out time series of
both a default-adjusted credit spread and the creditors’ time-varying expec-
tations about their eventual payo on each MinFin bond. Our time-series
analysis suggests that the GKO default lead to expectations of substantial
write-downs on MinFins, but that investors subsequently grew increasingly
optimistic that there would be (nearly) full recoveries of face value. Moreover,
markets seemed to \price in" the political risks related to the Russian gov-
ernment’s expressed views about the relative strengths of their commitments
to redeem the MinFins for face value at maturity.
In estimating our pricing models, we use a novel ecient estimation
methodology, based on a new approximation to the likelihood function3 for a
large class of ane diusions. The basic idea of our approach is to divide the
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state vector Xt into the sub-vector X
I
t that drives the stochastic volatility
of Xt and the sub-vector X
D
t of remaining state variables, as in the canoni-
cal representation of ane diusion models proposed by Dai and Singleton
(2000). For the special case in which the elements of XIt are independent
square-root processes,4 the conditional density function of XIt is known to
be the product of non-central chi-square distributions (Cox, Ingersoll, and
Ross (1985)). Furthermore, the conditional distribution of XDt , given both
Xt−1 and the intervening sample path fXIs ; t − 1 < s  tg; is normal with
conditional moments that are known in closed form. These properties allow
us to derive an approximation to the density of Xt conditional on Xt−1 that
leads to computationally tractable estimators for the models that we have
examined.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses
the nature of credit risk in sovereign debt markets, and then presents our
model for pricing sovereign debt. Section II introduces the parametric special
case underlying our analysis of Russian bonds and presents our estimation
methodology. Section III presents our empirical results for Russian bond
data.
I. Pricing Sovereign Debt
The nature of the economic factors that drive default decisions, and the
range of alternative restructuring and recovery plans considered in the event
of default, typically dier between sovereign and corporate debt. To motivate
our modeling strategy, we begin by discussing the nature of sovereign credit
risk and approaches that have been taken to modeling this risk in the existing
literature.
A. The Nature of Sovereign Credit Risk
A holder of sovereign debt may not have recourse to a bankruptcy code in the
event of default. Moreover, a sovereign default is largely a political decision.
Governments trade o the cost of making debt payments against reputa-
tion costs (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981), the costs of having assets abroad
seized, and the costs of having international trade impeded (Bulow and Ro-
go (1989b) and Gibson and Sundaresan (1999)). A sovereign rarely makes
an outright default. Rather, it may force a restructuring or renegotiation
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of its debt. Indeed, the same bond may be repeatedly renegotiated (Bulow
and Rogo 1989a). A sovereign also trades o the costs of default (or forced
restructuring) of internal versus external debt. As we shall see, this trade-
o has interesting implications for the pricing of dierent classes of Russian
debt. We are not aware of any theoretical papers that address this issue.
Indeed, most papers on sovereign debt address only external debt. Kremer
and Mehta (2000) study a model in which a government is more inclined to
default if a large proportion of its debt is held by foreigners.
Though, for these reasons and others, sovereign debt is notably dierent
than corporate debt, these instruments have typically been priced using sim-
ilar structural or reduced-form models of a single \default" credit event. In
the former, default occurs when incentives suggest that it is optimal for the
issuer to default, or when payment on debt is impossible. Default is some-
times modeled as the event that, at maturity, there are insucient assets
to pay down the debt, as in Merton (1974), or the event that the debtor’s
cash-flows or asset-liability ratio falls below some cut-o level for the rst
time, as in Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989). In reduced-form models,
the default time has an exogenously specied intensity process, and there-
fore arrives as a \surprise" (at an inaccessible stopping time) that is not
endogenously linked to (observed) decision variables of the debtor (Jarrow
and Turnbull (1995), Lando (1998), Due and Singleton (1999)). The ex-
ogenous intensity process may, however, be allowed to depend on observable
issuer-specic or macro-economic variables.
Structural models, which directly capture the default incentives and sol-
vency of the issuer, can be problematic when empirically modeling sovereign
debt. For instance, Deutsche Bank Research (1998b) states that \the Rus-
sian budget itself is of course largely ctitious in the sense that it can make
the decit pretty much what you want." Beyond this measurement issue, the
incentives of a sovereign to default are relatively complex. When a sovereign
defaults, it may lose assets held abroad, but assets held within the country
need not be seized as collateral. Rather, the country loses reputation for its
failure to make payments, which worsens its access to international capital
markets, and may impede international trade. Politicians trade o these
costs against the cost of making payments on the debt, along with other
political considerations (including their own personal incentives). Deutsche
Bank Research (1998a) writes: \We continue to maintain that a default de-
pends far more on Russia’s willingness to pay versus its ability to pay its
debt." The incentives of a corporation are usually simpler: It defaults (in
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theory) when it cannot make its payments, or when equity holders nd that
the market value of their shares has dropped to zero. Gibson and Sundaresan
(1999) present a formal model in which there are signicantly dierent opti-
mal default strategies for sovereign and corporate borrowers, in part because
sovereign debt is not directly covered by a bankruptcy code.
In the light of these and other pragmatic considerations, studies of sovereign
debt pricing have focused primarily on models based on an exogenously spec-
ied intensity process.5 Merrick (1999) calibrates a discrete-time model (to
Russian and Argentinian bonds) that can be reinterpreted as a model with a
constant (state-independent) intensity. More generally, Keswani (1999) and
Pages (2000) apply special cases of the modeling framework of Due and
Singleton (1999) to data on Latin American Brady bonds, and Dullmann
and Windfuhr (2000) apply a similar framework to pricing European gov-
ernment credit spreads under the EMU. Implicit in these formulations are
the assumptions that holders of sovereign debt face a single credit event |
default, with liquidation upon default | and that the bonds issued by a
given sovereign are homogeneous with regard to their credit characteristics.
The case of Russian bonds, and in particular the Russian MinFins on
which we focus in our empirical analysis, highlights the potential limita-
tions of applying corporate-bond pricing models to sovereign debt. Table I
lists a selection of the Russian U.S.-dollar-denominated debt that is studied
in Section III. In 1993, ve dollar-denominated MinFin bonds were issued
as payment to Russian exporters for Vnesheconombank accounts that were
frozen in 1991. In 1996, two additional MinFins were issued, and Russia is-
sued its rst Eurobond. Several more Eurobond issues followed in 1997 and
1998.
Based on past experiences with Soviet-era debt and the debts of other
sovereigns, investors in these bonds would surely have recognized that out-
right \default" was not the only possible, or indeed even the most likely,
credit event. More likely would be a restructuring, with possible additional
restructurings prior to maturity. In fact, between April, 1993 and August,
1999, the \Paris Club" of Western government creditors restructured its
Soviet-era debts with Russia ve times. Moreover, as part of any restructur-
ing, there is the possibility of write-downs of principal. The Russian Federa-
tion defaulted on the principal payments at maturity of the MinFin 3 bonds
that matured in May, 1999 (essentially, a write-down at maturity). More re-
cently, the restructuring of debt held by the Russian \London Club" of West-
ern commercial lenders announced in early 2000 called for both write-downs
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Issue Issue Date Maturity Coupon Amount Issued
(Billions of US$)
MinFin 3 5/14/1993 5/14/1999 3:00 1:32
MinFin 4 5/14/1993 5/14/2003 3:00 3:38
MinFin 5 5/14/1993 5/14/2008 3:00 2:84
MinFin 6 5/14/1996 5/14/2006 3:00 1:75
MinFin 7 5/14/1996 5/14/2011 3:00 1:75
Eurobond-01 11/27/1996 11/27/2001 9:25 2:40
Eurobond-07 6/26/1997 6/26/2007 10:00 1:00
Table I: Contractual Characteristics of Russian Dollar-denominated MinFins and Eu-
robonds.
and obligor status. In 1997, the London Club restructured its Soviet-era
debt into two securities: $6 billion of principal notes (Prins) and $20 billion
of interest-arrears notes (IANs). The subsequent restructuring announced in
2000 called for reductions in principal of 37.5% and 33% of the Prins and
IANs, respectively, and a change in obligor status from Vnesheconombank
to the Russian Federation through the issue of Eurobonds (IMF (2000a)).
Additionally, the legal covenants of these bonds and the characteristics
of the markets in which they were traded presented investors with a rather
complex menu of credit and liquidity risks. Eurobonds are much like U.S.
corporate bonds in that they have cross-default triggers. That is, failure to
make payments on one bond allows the owners of other bonds to accelerate
their bonds, requiring immediate repayment of the principal. If a company
defaults on one bond, then other creditors have an incentive to join the re-
structuring, for otherwise the restructuring agreement between the equity
holders and holders of bonds in default might severely lower the value of the
bonds that are not (yet) in default. Hence, for corporate bonds, cross-default
triggers protect bondholders from discrimination. For sovereign bonds, on
the other hand, cross-default triggers may have little eect, because the own-
ers of other bonds may have little incentive to exercise their right to accelerate
their bonds and join in a restructuring. Even among Eurobonds, the nature
of this \right to accelerate" diers. Russian Eurobonds are governed by U.K.
laws which, relative to the U.S. system, have collective-action clauses that
make it easier for bondholders to initiate restructurings.
In contrast, although MinFins are denominated in U.S. dollars, they are
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technically domestic debt under the jurisdiction of Russian law and have no
cross-default clauses. This gives the Ministry of Finance some discretion in
deciding which creditors are most severely aected by a credit event (for
example, which bonds will default), as well as discretion over the nature of
a credit event, including the eective recovery rate.
Another feature of Russian MinFins is the importance of \political" risk.
The Ministry of Finance has drawn a clear distinction between their commit-
ments to fulll the principal obligations of \Soviet-era" versus \post-Soviet-
era" debt. MinFins 3 through 5, as indicated in Table 1, were issued in 1993,
and hence are technically \post-Soviet-era" debt, but were issued to address
\Soviet-era" problems. There has been no explicit commitment by Russia to
repay their principals at maturity. In fact, Russia defaulted on the principal
obligation of the MinFin 3 bonds in 1999. In contrast, the Russian Ministry
of Finance has publicly committed to fulll all of its payment obligations on
the MinFin 6 and MinFin 7, as well as on the Eurobonds.
The eects of the Russian default on GKOs in August, 1998 on the prices
of MinFins are displayed in Figure 1, which shows the prices of ve MinFin
bonds from 1/2/1998 to 11/17/2000, relative to their prices on 7/31/1998
(just prior to default). Note, rst of all, that MinFin prices fell by approxi-
mately 80% during the week of the Russian default, suggesting that market
participants were indeed surprised by this credit event right up to the time
of the event itself. This is roughly consistent with default arrival at an inac-
cessible stopping time, as in our intensity-based modeling approach.
Second, the general patterns of relative prices around the time of default
suggest that a fractional recovery of market value is not an unreasonable
assumption relative, say, to a typical alternative assumption that bondholders
would recover an exogenous fraction of the bond’s face value. Third, the fact
that the price of the MinFin 3 did not approach its face value just prior
to maturity suggests that many investors believed, prior to May, 1999, that
they would not receive 100% of face value at maturity of these MinFins.
Essentially, this bond had already gone into default in August, 1998, although
the precise terms of default were not known at that time. Likewise, we could
think of the other MinFins as being in default after August, 1998. These
bonds have recently recovered substantially, however, which we interpret as
a sign of investors being more optimistic about the impact of the (implicit)
default of August, 1998 on the eventual payments at maturity. This optimism
was also reflected in the index of Russian stock prices shown in Figure 1.
Fourth, the MinFins recovered about 20{30% of their previous market
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Figure 1. Prices of Russian MinFin 3–7 bonds over the time period from 1/2/1998 to
11/17/2000, normalized so that they all have a market value of 100 at 7/31/1998 (just
prior to default). Source: Datastream.
values after the credit event of August, 1998, whereas the Eurobonds (not
shown) recovered around 30{40% of their market values. Additionally, Fig-
ure 1 shows that the MinFin 6 and MinFin 7 bonds have recovered larger
fractions of their pre-default values than have the MinFin 4 and 5 bonds.
Hence, since the August, 1998 default, investors may have been viewing Eu-
robonds and post-Soviet MinFins as being of higher quality than Soviet-era
MinFins. We shall later examine whether this viewpoint was reflected in
pre-default prices.
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B. A Model for Pricing Sovereign Debt
Initially, we characterize the price, Pt, at any time t before default, of a
sovereign security that promises to pay a single, possibly random, amount
Z at some time T > t. We x a probability space and an increasing family
fFt : t  0g of information sets dening the resolution of information over
time, with Z 2 FT . We take as given a short-rate6 process r and an equivalent
martingale measure Q. (See Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Delbaen and
Schachermayer (1999) for the essential equivalence of the existence of such
a measure and the absence of arbitrage.) That is, a security paying some
amount ~Z at some time (possibly a stopping time) S has a market value at
any time t before S of EQt
h
e
∫ S
t
−r(u) du ~Z
i
, where EQt denotes Ft-conditional
expectation with respect to Q. Uniqueness of the risk-neutral measure Q is
not to be expected in our setting.
For the case of a single credit event (default), Due and Singleton (1999)
showed that for pricing purposes we can treat the cashflow X as default-
free and allow for default risk by replacing the discount rate r(t) with the
\default-adjusted" discount rate r(t) + h(t)L(t), where h is the risk-neutral
intensity of default and L is risk-neutral expected fractional loss in market
value in the event of default. In modeling sovereign spreads, we extend this
model to one that accommodates many types of credit and liquidity events, in
particular the types (i)–(iii) of events enumerated in the introduction. This
yields a pricing formula similar to that derived (in a less general setting) by
Scho¨nbucher (1998), who considers multiple defaults.
To accommodate multiple types of credit events, we let Nt be the number
of credit events of any type that have happened by time t, where N is a
counting process with risk-neutral intensity process7 h. We assume that, at
the n-th credit event, the promised payment of the security is lowered to a
fraction, Yn, of its pre-credit-event value. For example, a sovereign issuer
may simply unilaterally announce at the rst credit event that the principal
that it recognizes as an obligation is reduced by 50%, in which case Y1 = 0:5.
This leaves open the possibility of a further repudiation at a later date. Also,
at the n-th credit event, investors may receive, or prospectively value, cash
flows paid by the issuer in lieu of the repudiated portion of the debt, with
a current market value that is a fraction Wn of the pre-credit-event market
value of the obligation.8 We assume that h, fYng, and fWng are exogenously
given. The total eective fractional loss in market value caused by the n-th
credit event is thus 1−Yn−Wn. At time t, the risk-neutral expected fractional
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loss associated with the next credit event, were it to occur immediately, is
denoted Lt.
9 Hence, the process describing the risk-neutral mean fractional
loss rate (due to credit events) is hL.
We also allow liquidity to aect pricing. As in Due and Singleton (1999),
we make the simplistic assumption that illiquidity of the security translates
into a fractional cost rate of l, where l is a predictable process. Hence, the
total mean loss rate of the security due to credit events and illiquidity is
hL+ l. If the repudiated fraction Yn is observable at the event time n (that
is, Yn 2 Fn), then, at time t the security is worth the fraction
Q
nN(t) Yn
of an otherwise identical security that has not yet experienced credit events.
This gives the intuition for the following pricing formula.
Theorem 1 Let R = r + s, where
s = hL+ l: (1)
Suppose that Vt = E
Q
t

e−
∫ T
t Ru duZ

is well defined, and that (almost surely),
the process V does not jump at a credit event time.10 If the repudiated fraction
Yn is observable at the event time n, then,
Pt = E
Q
t

e−
∫ T
t
Ru duZ
 Y
nNt
Yn: (2)
We refer to the process s in (1) as the short (or instantaneous) spread. The
condition that V does not jump at a credit event time is automatically satis-
ed in our model of Russian bond prices because Vt depends on the current
level of a diusion process.
Our treatment counts all credit events with a single process N . One could
also distinguish among dierent types of credit events. Suppose, for instance,
that, under the given risk-neutral measure Q, liquidation events have inten-
sity process h1 and expected fractional loss process L1, that restructuring
likewise has intensity h2 and expected fractional loss L2, and that regime
switches occur with intensity h3 and expected fractional loss L3. Assuming
that not more than one of these events can happen at any one time, the total
risk-neutral intensity process of a credit event is h = h1 + h2 + h3, and the
expected fractional loss at such an event is the intensity-weighted average,
L = h
1
h
L1 + h
2
h
L2 + h
3
h
L3. Hence, by Theorem 1, the short spread is
s = h1L1 + h2L2 + h3L3 + l: (3)
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Ideally, sucient data would be available to identify each term of (3) sepa-
rately, but this is not the case for our analysis of Russia and so we shall not
attempt such a disentangling of credit event types in our empirical analysis.
Even without formal econometric analysis, the behavior of the prices of
MinFin 3 shown in Figure 1 suggests that allowing for the risk of write-downs
that are instigated by the default on GKOs is critical for pricing Russian
bonds. As the MinFin 3 matured in 1999, its price approached about a third
of its face value. In a purely intensity-based model of credit risk, however,
because MinFin 3 was not in default, its price must approach face value at
maturity. Not only does the observed pattern call for a write-down, but it
challenges the strong assumption of Theorem 1, that the fraction Yn of the
notional that is recovered due to the n-th credit event is observable at the
associated credit event time n. An empirically more plausible view is that, as
a consequence of the default on GKOs in August, 1998, bond prices reflected
investors’ expected payment at maturity, and that investors’ expectations
were subsequently revised upwards over time toward one-third of face value
as market and economic conditions changed.
To formalize the idea of \expected payments at maturity," we allow for
bond investors to learn more about the extent of the write-down after the
time of the credit event itself, including the possibility that the nal resolu-
tion of the impact of a re-structuring is learned only at maturity. Although
such learning substantially increases the diculty of pricing sovereign bonds,
we can extend our pricing relation under the (unrealistically strong) assump-
tion of Independent Recovery: Under Q, fY1; Y2; : : : g are independent, and
independent also of fZ; r; l; N;W1;W2; : : : g. With this assumption, our pric-
ing result extends as follows.
Theorem 2 Let R = r+s, where s = hL+l. Suppose that Vt = E
Q
t

e−
∫ T
t Ru duZ

is well defined, and that (almost surely), V does not jump at a credit event
time. Under the assumption of Independent Recovery,
Pt = E
Q
t

e−
∫ T
t Ru duZ
 Y
nNt
EQt (Yn): (4)
The Independent Recovery assumption is strong because, for instance, as eco-
nomic conditions in Russia improve, we would expect both that EQt (Yn) is
revised upward and that the credit-event arrival intensity h declines. The
independence assumption does, however, allow for state-dependent write-
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downs EQt (Yn) that substantially increase the flexibility of our model in cap-
turing market price movements. In particular, subsequent to the rst credit
event, when at least one EQt (Yn) term is present in (4), bond prices may jump
up or down as investors revise their expectations about the consequences of
past credit events for eventual receipts at maturity. Such jumps might occur
at any time, including just prior to the maturity of the bond. A notable
example of the type of jumpiness that may capture with stochastic EQt (Yn)
is the rather saw-toothed pattern of the price of MinFin 3 in 1999 prior to
its default at maturity (Figure 1). We note that jumps in EQt (Yn) are con-
ceptually distinct from jumps in prices that might occur as a consequence of
jumps in the short spread s, due say to a jump in the risk-neutral intensity
of credit events. Our conceptual framework extends immediately to allow for
such jumps in R, using results of Due, Pan, and Singleton (2000).
These theorems give the price of a security with a single promised cash
flow. The price of a security with multiple cash flows (such as coupons and
principal) is, under our assumptions of exogenous intensity, loss rate, and
liquidity, just the sum of the prices of the individual cash flows. Further,
these pricing relations allow for dierent write-down factors, Y c and Y f ,
for coupons and principal, respectively. For our empirical analysis we set
Y c = Y f , thereby focusing on a partial or full repudiation of the principal
of a coupon bond, with the original terms otherwise unchanged. If, for this
case, the fractional market values W c and W f paid in lieu of the repudiated
portions of the coupons and principal, respectively, are identical, then a single
short-spread process, s can be used to price all of a bond’s promised cash
flows. Each distinct bond issue may be valued by its own distinct spread
process, however, as in our subsequent parametric pricing model for Russian
bonds.
An attractive feature of the pricing relations (2) and (4) is that valuation
can proceed using familiar term-structure analytics once the functional rela-
tions between the spread, s, the expected repudiation EQt (Yn) (in the case of
Theorem 2), and the state vector are chosen. In particular, the tractability
of ane term-structure models (Due and Kan (1996), Dai and Singleton
(2000)) can be exploited for pricing sovereign debt. The next section presents
one possible ane model of sovereign bond prices, the one that we will use
for studying Russian bond data.
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II. Specification and Estimation of a Paramet-
ric Pricing Model
Within the ane family of term-structure models we can, in principle, allow
for general ane dependence among the state variables driving the riskless
term structure and the sovereign short spread (bond by bond), subject to the
requirement that the model gives well-dened prices. It is computationally
convenient, however, to work with \recursive" models that allow estimation
of the parameters governing the reference term structure in a rst stage,
followed by estimation of a model of the spread process, s, in a second stage.
This section presents the recursive model that we use in our empirical analysis
and introduces a new \approximate" maximum likelihood estimator that is
applicable to a broad class of ane term-structure models, including the one
that we will implement for Russian data.
A. Parametric Model of the Reference Curve
We use the term structure of U.S.-dollar LIBOR-quality swap yields as the
reference curve for our analysis. Though swaps are defaultable, reliable pric-
ing of their cash flows is obtained by using a standard default-free term-
structure model, whose default-free short-rate process is replaced with a re-
freshed LIBOR-quality default-adjusted short rate r (Due and Singleton
(1997), Due and Huang (1996), Collin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001)). Work-
ing with the treasury curve as the reference curve would give quantitatively
similar results, given that the credit risk in Russian bonds is orders of mag-
nitude larger than default risk in the swap market. Advantages of swap over
Treasury yields are that they are unencumbered by the eects of repo specials
and tax advantages, and are available on a constant-maturity basis.
We assume a two-factor ane model for the reference term structure,
with the dynamics of the short rate, r, and the process, v, driving volatility
given by:
d

vt
rt

=

Kvv 0
Krv Krr

v
r

−

vt
rt

dt+
p
vt

1 0
rv rr

dW v;rt ; (5)
where W v;r = (W v;W r)> is a two-dimensional standard Brownian motion.
This parameterization allows both for correlation of unconstrained sign be-
tween the factors (through both the drift and diusion terms), and for
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stochastic volatility in r induced by v. This is in contrast to the pure Gaus-
sian or pure CIR-style two-factor models, which each accommodate one, but
not both, of these features.
To complete the model, we specify the distribution of the risk-neutral11
Brownian motion ~W v;r as:
dW v;rt = −
p
vt p
vt
 
v
r

dt+ d ~W v;rt ; (6)
where (v; r) are the \market prices of risk." Finally, we denote the param-
eter vector of the reference model by
 = (v; r; Kvv; Krv; Krr;rr;rv; v; r):
B. An Approximate Maximum Likelihood Estimator
From the literature on the estimation of ane term-structure models, we
know the functional relation between the vector ct of reference yields used in
estimation and the state vector X 0t  (rt; vt) is ct = g(Xt; ), for a dieren-
tiable function g that is easily computed.12 At a given parameter vector  ,
the model-implied state vector X t is thus given by
X t := g(  ; )−1(ct); (7)
assuming invertibility (which is not an issue in our application). Through-
out, we use the notation \p(X jZ; )" to denote the conditional density of
some random vector X given some random vector Z, at a parameter vector
 (assuming this density exists); and likewise use \p(X; )" for the uncon-
ditional density. Letting c = (c1; : : : ; cT ) denote the sequence of observed
vectors of reference yields, standard change-of-variable arguments lead to the
likelihood
p(c; ) =
TY
t=1
p(X t
 X t−1; ) 1j detDg(X t ; )j ; (8)
where, for ane models, the Jacobian Dg can be easily computed.
Unfortunately, the transition density p(Xt
 Xt−1; ) of an ane diu-
sion X is not generally known in closed form, outside of special cases, such as
Gaussian and independent square-root diusions. We have found, however,
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that a simple approximation to the likelihood function leads to reliable es-
timates in a large sub-class of ane models, including the models examined
in this paper. Our approximation is based on the observation that, without
loss of generality for a large family of ane diusions, we can partition as
X = (XI ; XD) 2 Rn+Rm, where the distribution of XIt conditional on XIt−1
is non-central chi-square and the distribution of XDt conditional on Xt−1 and
the entire path of XI between dates t−1 and t is normal. Thus, to obtain an
approximation to p(Xt
 Xt−1; ) we need only approximate the second of
these distributions and, as discussed in Appendix B, this can be done reliably
in a computationally tractable way. The resulting ML estimator is more e-
cient than the quasi-ML estimator (see, for example, Fisher and Gilles (1996)
and Duee and Stanton (2001)). Asymptotic eciency of our ML estima-
tor is achieved by the simulated-method-of-moments estimator proposed by
Gallant and Tauchen (1996) (and used by Dai and Singleton (2000)), but the
latter is substantially more computationally intensive.
For our specic application, the log-likelihood of the yield vector c is
L(c; ) =
1
T
TX
t=1
h
log p(v t ; r
 
t
 v t−1; r t−1)− log j detDg(v t ; r t ; )j
i
:
The maximum likelihood estimator,  ^, for  is then dened by
 ^ = argmax
 
L(c; ):
Under standard technical conditions (see, for instance, Davidson and MacK-
innon (1993)),  ^ is consistent and ecient with respect to the data (c1; : : : ; cT ).
In particular, as T !1,  ^ a:s:!  and
T 1=2( ^ −  ) L! N(0;Ω); (9)
where
L! denotes convergence in law, and
Ω−1 = E

@L(c ; )@L(c ; )>
@ @ 

= −E

@2L(c ; )
@ @ >

: (10)
Moreover, Ω can be estimated consistently, under these conditions, by the
sample counterpart of (10).
The reference LIBOR swap term-structure model is estimated using weekly
data on two- and ten-year swap rates for the period 1/1/1988 to 7/23/1999.
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Based on a preliminary empirical investigation, we found that there was
little deterioration in t by imposing the constraints that v = 0 (the mar-
ket price of volatility risk is zero) and that, for a small constant " > 0,
v = (1 + ")=(2Kvv). This ensures that the Feller condition, guaranteeing
that vt is strictly positive for all t with probability one, is satised with a
margin of ". Lastly, we set the long-run mean, r, of the reference short rate,
r, equal to its implied sample mean13 in order to improve the average t of
the reference curve to the swap rates across the relevant range of maturities
used in our subsequent analysis of Russian bond spreads. The parameter
estimates are given in Table IV in Appendix D.
For our purpose of constructing a reference curve relative to which Rus-
sian yield spreads can be investigated, the resulting t seems more than ad-
equate. Between maturities of two and ten years, the average pricing errors,
measured as the average dierences between historical and model-implied
swap yields, are all less than ve basis points, with sample standard devia-
tions of the tting errors of less than ten basis points. Even for swaps with
fteen years to maturity (used to compute model-implied credit spreads for
the Russian bond with the longest maturity), the average tting errors were
under twenty basis points. This error is small relative to the magnitude of
historical credit spreads in the Russian sovereign market.
C. A Parametric Model of Spreads
To accommodate idiosyncratic components in the short spreads of dierent
bonds of the same issuer, we select one sovereign bond as a \benchmark," and
model the joint behavior of the riskless term structure and the benchmark
short spread s as:
d
2
4vtrt
st
3
5 =
2
4K
vv 0 0
Krv Krr 0
Ksv Ksr Kss
3
5
0
@
2
4
v
r
s
3
5−
2
4vtrt
st
3
5
1
A dt+ (11)
2
4 1 0 0rv rr 0
sv sr ss
3
5
2
4
p
vt p
vt
1
3
5 dWt;
where W = (W v;W r;W s) is a standard Brownian motion in R3. The fact
that s can take on negative values is not logically inconsistent with our
theoretical model because of the possibility of a negative liquidity factor,
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l, in (1).14 Extending (6), we take ~W = ( ~W v; ~W r; ~W s) to be a risk-neutral
standard Brownian motion with
dW st = −s dt+ d ~W st ; (12)
with s being the market price of spread risk. Though not the most flexible
parameterization of the market prices of risk (see Duee (2000) and Dai
and Singleton (2001)), this is relatively standard for ane models (Dai and
Singleton (2000)).
For any non-benchmark bond i 2 f1; : : : ; Ig of the same issuer, we assume
that its short-spread process is si = s+ γi, where
dγit = 
i
(
i − γit

dt+ idit; (13)
and i is a standard Brownian motion independent of fW; j : j 6= ig. The
idiosyncratic factor γi is specic to bond i, and not to a maturity segment of
the sovereign yield curve, and captures special liquidity or default features
of the ith bond. We experimented with alternative parameterizations of γi,
including a square-root process, but this Gaussian formulation seemed to
best t the data.
The distribution of the idiosyncratic Brownian motion i under the risk-
neutral measure is specied by
dit =
(
i − ~i γit dt+ d~it ; (14)
where ~W; ~1; : : : ; ~I are independent standard Brownian motions under Q,
and ~i is a constant. Following Duee (2000), this specication oers the
flexibility of dierent rates of mean reversion for γ under the actual and risk-
neutral measures. This, in turn, implies that the risk premium associated
with the idiosyncratic factor it contributes to time-variation in the excess re-
turn on the ith bond, something that is precluded by the standard Gaussian
specication, in which (i − ~i) γit dt is replaced by −i dt in (14). Allow-
ing this contribution of the Gaussian  to time-variation in excess returns
improved the t of our model.
To estimate the parameters
 =
(
s; Ksv; Ksr; Kss;sv;sr;ss; s; (i; i; i; ~i)i=1;::: ;I

governing the spreads, we use data on I + 1 (we have I = 2 in our ap-
plication) defaultable bond prices, which we denote as b. The prices im-
plied by the model are of the form H(vt; rt; st; γt; ; ), where H is a sum
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of known exponential-ane functions of the state vector (vt; rt; st; γt), where
γt = (γ
1
t ; : : : ; γ
I
t ). The state variables (rt; vt) are set to the values (v^t; r^t) =
(v ˆt ; r
 ˆ
t ) implied by the reference model evaluated at the maximum-likelihood
estimates  ^. We then estimate  by15
^ = argmax

L(c; b;  ^; ): (15)
Under regularity, ^ is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed,
with an asymptotic covariance matrix that (when applicable) reflects the
\two-step" nature of the estimation strategy.
III. The Case of Russia
Using this model of sovereign credit spreads, we proceed to examine the
pricing of Russian bonds during the late 1990’s. After a brief overview of the
macroeconomic climate in Russia leading up to this default, we estimate our
pricing model using weekly data over the sample period February 4, 1994
through August 7, 1998, ending just prior to the GKO default, which is the
rst clear credit event in the sample. We then explore the implications of
tting \through the default," using the extended model (4).
A. Russian Debt and Macro-economic Developments
In this paper, we focus on the MinFins and the (dollar-denominated) Eu-
robonds, because there are natural reference curves relative to which we can
study Russian credit spreads. Figure 2 shows the yield spreads of three Min-
Fin bonds relative to US swap rates for our pre-default sample period from
2/4/1994 to 7/31/1998. The spreads of these bonds were high until the end
of 1995, due to signicant uncertainty regarding Russia’s ability and will-
ingness to service its debt. In 1995, the Russian government implemented a
series of reforms. IMF (1999b) writes that
\(: : : ) the authorities resolved in 1995 to achieve a decisive reduc-
tion in inflation via a tight monetary policy supported by a halv-
ing of the federal budget decit to under 6 percent of GDP. (: : : )
Finally, to foster stability of the ruble, they adopted an exchange-
rate band system from July 1995. Despite political pressures, the
18
02
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
pe
rc
en
t
MinFin 3
MinFin 4
MinFin 5
2/4/94
1/13/95
12/29/95
12/13/96
11/28/97
11/13/98
Figure 2. Yield spreads (relative to the Dollar swap curve) of the Russian MinFin 3–5
bonds over the period 2/4/1994 to 7/31/1998.
authorities stuck to their program, and their main goals were
achieved."
Because of these reforms, the spreads of Russian MinFins started to decline in
1995. In July 1996, Yeltsin was re-elected, which increased trust in stability,
and strengthened the market-oriented reformers, reducing spreads further. In
this period, optimism was growing, and January-September 1997 is referred
to as \The Zenith of Expectations" in IMF (1999b). In September 1997, the
spread of the MinFin 3 reached an all-time low, just under 2 percent.
Nevertheless, the Russian government was running large budget decits
throughout the nineties, and the structural reforms implemented to improve
the economic strength of the country were having limited success. (Russian
real GDP contracted by an estimated 33% from 1993 to the end of 1998
(IMF (1999b)).) Starting in October 1997, and continuing into 1998, Russia’s
problems started to further deteriorate (IMF (1999b)). The prices of Russian
commodities | in particular, the price of Brent oil | declined. Partly as a
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consequence, Russia’s current account turned negative in 1997 for the rst
time since the start of the reforms. Furthermore, the Asian crisis was driving
investors away from emerging markets globally, and in November 1997 the
Ruble came under pressure, forcing Russia to increase domestic interest rates
to defend the exchange-rate band. Hence, starting in October 1997, and
continuing into the spring and summer of 1998, spreads were driven up, and
Russia was downgraded by several credit-rating agencies.
These developments did not prevent Russia from issuing new Eurobonds
| in fact Russia issued ve Eurobonds in 1998, one in March, one in April,
two in June, and one in July. The rst four of these were oversubscribed (IMF
(1999a)). Some market participants even talked about \feeding frenzies" in
connection with new Russian issues. Yield-seeking investors evidently pre-
sumed that Russia was too important a country for major industrial nations
to allow it to collapse. The 1998 Eurobonds were issued in anticipation of
shortfalls in cash needed to make payments on short-term domestic debt and
to service foreign debt. In addition, the IMF reluctantly agreed to give Rus-
sia additional loans. In August, 1998 it became clear that these measures
were not enough to establish sucient liquidity for Russia, and there was a
substantial outflow of capital from Russia.
On August 17, 1998, Russia announced a compulsory restructuring of
the domestic government debt (GKO and OFZ). A 90-day moratorium was
placed on foreign commercial debt, and the exchange-rate band was devalued.
At this time, it was unclear whether Russia would also default on external
sovereign debt. Subsequently, however, Russia defaulted on the London-Club
debt, the Paris-Club debt, and the principal of the MinFin 3, which matured
in 1999. As of this writing, Russia remains current on interest payments on
the remainder of the MinFins and Eurobonds.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of MinFin prices during and after this crisis.
The prices of MinFins dropped initially to about 20{30% of their pre-default
market values, but have since recovered substantially. The recovery can be
attributed to Russia’s favorable macroeconomic developments and to the
fact that interest payments were made in both 1999 and 2000. Over the
two years subsequent to this default, Russian real GDP grew at an annual
rate of 6{7%, the current account was consistently positive due to reduced
imports and increasing exports (largely driven by increasing oil prices), and
the scal budget of the federal government was heading in 2000 toward a
surplus (IMF (2000b)). Similarly, the Eurobond prices were reduced during
the GKO default to around 30{40% of their pre-default market values, but
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they too have largely recovered.
B. Pre-Default Analysis
Initially, we focus on pre-default weekly data, over the sample period 2/4/1994
to 7/31/1998, for the yields on the MinFin 3, 4, and 5 bonds. These are the
dollar-denominated bonds with the longest available time series. MinFin 4
was chosen as the benchmark bond because it had the largest amount of
principal outstanding (see Table I).
The ML estimates of the model are displayed in the rst column of Ta-
ble II. We have imposed four over-identifying restrictions because of the high
2/94{7/98 SD 2/94{10/00 SD
s 0:0200 (18:03) 0:1086 (31:45)
Ksv 0:0230 (0:017) 0:0125 (0:015)
Ksr 0:0898 (0:158) 0:1277 (0:160)
Kss 0:2112 (0:019) 0:1367 (0:015)
1 1:3433 (0:815) 1:2415 (0:767)
2 1:8690 (0:961) 0:4699 (0:512)
ss 7:8895 (0:521) 10:867 (0:819)
1 2:4126 (0:261) 2:4279 (0:254)
2 0:3518 (0:189) 0:4261 (0:213)
s −0:2547 (0:483) −0:2531 (0:398)
~1 −0:1989 (0:057) −0:1825 (0:056)
~2 −0:2301 (0:064) −0:2110 (0:062)
Table II: The first and third columns contain the parameter estimates for the sample
periods 2/94–7/98 (the pre-default sample) and 2/94–10/00 (the full sample), respectively.
The columns labeled SD give standard deviations estimated using the outer product of
the first derivatives of the likelihood function. (Standard errors estimated using the second
derivative of the likelihood function are similar.) These standard errors are not corrected
for the facts that the swap parameters have been estimated, and that the Russian bond
data are non-stationary because of changing maturities.
dimension of the parameter space. We set the long-run means, 1 and 2,
of the idiosyncratic factors, γ1 and γ2, to zero, because they were found to
be insignicantly dierent from zero at conventional levels of signicance.
Likewise, we set sv = sr = 0. The model allows the benchmark spread
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factor, s, to be correlated with both the reference LIBOR short rate r and
its volatility v, since Ksv and Ksr may be non-zero. We note that the id-
iosyncratic factors are estimated to be risk-neutrally \explosive" because ~1
and ~2 are negative. One interpretation of this is that investors have a high
degree of risk aversion with respect to changes in these factors.
B.1. The Benchmark Spread
Figure 3 displays time series of the implied benchmark short spread (the
instantaneous spread s for MinFin 4). The basic pattern in Figure 3 fol-
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Figure 3. The solid line shows the benchmark short spread, s, and the dashed line
shows the short spread adjusted for differences between the model-implied short rate and
the 1-month LIBOR, that is st + rt − robst .
lows that of the raw yields in Figure 2. It is notable, however, how low the
short spread was in September and October, 1997. This may have been a
manifestation of \over pricing" in the market, consistent with with observa-
tions made by some market participants. For instance, Malleret, Orlova, and
Romanov (1999) write: \In 1996 and 1997, Russia was the darling of inter-
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national investors. : : : the investors had been buying not the unappealing
reality, but Russia’s expected bright future." Additionally, the IMF (1999a)
writes: \there is clear evidence that Russia represents a case where many
investors bought securities that they did not fully understand : : : Some in-
vestors in MinFins appear to have lacked a full understanding of their legal
status, including the jurisdiction in which they where issued." Without the
benet of such a dynamic term-structure model, it would have been dicult
to pick up this puzzling pattern of the short-maturity MinFin and reference
LIBOR instruments trading at comparable spreads.
Of course, we must also entertain the explanation of model misspecica-
tion or inaccurate parameter estimates. One potential problem could be that
our model does not match LIBOR short rates perfectly. To determine the
extent of this problem, we compute an adjusted short spread as st+rt−robst ,
where robst is the 1-month LIBOR rate. Figure 3 shows that the dierence be-
tween the short spread and its adjusted version is small. Indeed, the adjusted
benchmark short spread is also negative when the short spread is. It may
also be that the model is understating the short spread s during September,
1997. From Figure 6 we can infer that s+γMinF in3 > s during this period, so
spreads on the shorter maturity MinFin 3 were larger than those on MinFin
4. However, it seems unlikely that such mis-specication would fully account
for the strikingly low level of s, even if it reversed the nding that short-term
MinFins would be trading through LIBOR (the period of negative s).
According to our macroeconomic overview, the risks of a Russian de-
fault or restructuring, and hence the short spread s, should be influenced
by government balance-sheet variables and related variables that influence
internal and external balances. One such variable is the price of Brent oil.
Fuel products constituted between 40% and 50% of Russia’s exports in the
period that we consider, and oil products contributed to more than half of
this (IMF (1999b)). Hence, the oil price is important in determining both
Russia’s current account and budget decit. Another relevant credit-related
variable is the total level of foreign currency reserves, minus gold, held by
the Russian central bank.
As a preliminary examination of the potential influence of these variables,
we regressed the tted spread s onto the Brent oil price index (OIL) and
total Russian reserves (RESERV E) using monthly data, and obtained
st =26:7−0:277 OILt− 0:0010 RESERV Et + "t;
(8:9) (0:52) (0:0002)
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with an R2 of 81.4%. Standard errors, corrected for heteroscedasticity us-
ing the Newey-West method, are shown parenthetically. As expected, both
regression coecients are negative | the spread is low in periods when the
oil price is high and the reserves are high | although only the RESERV E-
coecient is statistically signicant at conventional levels.
To explore the dynamic relations among these variables, we estimate a
sixth-order vector-autoregression (VAR) for RESERV E, OIL, and s, in that
order. Figure 4 displays the implied orthogonalized impulse-response func-
tions, along with two-standard-error condence bands computed by Monte
Carlo using the approach outlined in the RATS regression package manual.
We see that shocks to the spread itself die out during a few months. Shocks
to the oil price and reserves, on the other hand, build up over almost a year.
As we would expect, positive shocks to oil prices and reserves are estimated
to imply a reduction in the spread in the following period.
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Figure 4. Orthogonalized impulse-response functions of the short rate based on a VAR
of the short rate, the oil price, and Russian reserves.
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Using the estimates of the benchmark short-spread process, we can also
decompose the term structure of model-implied credit spreads on Russian
zero-coupon bonds into components associated with the risk factors r, v,
and s. The model implies that the yield of a reference zero-coupon bond
with maturity  is of the the form A() + Bv()vt + B
r()rt, and that the
yield of a zero-coupon bond with the same credit risk as the MinFin 4 is of
the form A() + Bv()vt + B
r()rt + B
s()st, where A, B
v, Br, A, Bv, Br,
Bs can be found as solutions to Riccati equations (Due and Kan (1996)).
Hence, the term structure of zero-coupon yield spreads at time t is given, at
maturity  , by,
A()−A() + ( Bv()− Bv() vt + ( Br()−Br() rt + Bs()st: (16)
The estimated mean term structure of yield spreads, found by replacing the
state variables in (16) by their model-implied sample means, is downward
sloping as is common for low-quality bonds.
Each \triple" of lines in Figure 5 shows each term of (16), with the coef-
cients replaced by their estimates and the state variables replaced by their
implied sample means (middle gure), as well as means plus and minus twice
the sample standard deviations of the state variables (corresponding to the
upper and lower dashed lines). We see that changes in the level of the
instantaneous reference short rate have almost no eect on the term struc-
ture of yield spreads, for given values of v and s. When v increases, the
spreads on long-maturity bonds narrow, though variation in v contributes
only marginally to the overall variation in the spread. Most of the variation
of the zero spreads is due to changes in s (with possible indirect eects of
r and v through their correlations with s). The sample correlation between
the changes in r and in s is −0:18, which is consistent with the negative
correlations between instantaneous reference and spread factors in empirical
studies of corporate bond yields (for instance, Duee (1999)). The sample
correlation of changes in v and s is 0:46. Since changes in v have a correlation
with changes in the ten-year swap yield of approximately 0:90, the positive
correlation of v and s suggests that movements in the long end of the swap
curve are positively correlated with changes in short-term sovereign credit
spreads.
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Figure 5. A decomposition of the term structure of spreads into its components. Each
“triple” of lines shows each term of (16) evaluated at different values of the state. The
(upper, middle, lower) line is obtained with each state variable replaced by (+2; ; −
2), where  represents its mean and  represents its volatility.
B.2. Relative Spread Behavior
Including the idiosyncratic factor γi in the discount rates of a non-benchmark
MinFins implies that the tted MinFin yields match their sample counter-
parts exactly. The model-implied estimates of these factors are plotted in
Figures 6 and 7. If the γi processes are near zero, the markets for the three
MinFins are well integrated and they share expected recoveries and default
likelihoods. On the other hand, large absolute values of γi would indicate sig-
nicant dierences is credit characteristics or liquidity between the ith bond
and the benchmark. Clearly, during several periods, the market was treating
MinFin 3, in particular, dierently than MinFin 4.
Data limitations make it dicult to determine a breakdown of the total
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Figure 6. Idiosyncratic factor, γ1, for
MinFin 3.
Figure 7. Idiosyncratic factor, γ2, for
MinFin 5.
idiosyncratic factor γi into perceived dierences (from MinFin 4) in liquidity,
expected recovery, or the likelihood of a default or restructuring. In an
attempt to assess the eects of relative liquidities on each γi, we compared
the time paths of the \relative bid-ask spread" (the bid-ask spread divided
by the mid price) to those of the tted γi. There did not appear to be strong
co-movements induced by changes in the bid-ask spreads, however, so we
are led to conclude that relative liquidities as measured by bid-ask spreads
are not the primary explanation for the variation in idiosyncratic spreads of
MinFins 3 and 5.
Indirect evidence of the contributions of credit risk to γi comes from align-
ing movements in these idiosyncratic spread factors with key macroeconomic
developments. We focus on the idiosyncratic factor, γ1, of MinFin 3, since
it is larger in magnitude that that of MinFin 5. Initially, γ1 varies around
zero. Then, from May 1995 to August/October, 1996, γ1 is negative. After
October 1996, it is again close to zero. One story for this pattern is that the
Russian reforms implemented in 1995 were viewed positively by the market,
but were expected to have mostly shorter-term eects. Therefore, the short-
est bond, MinFin 3, became expensive (compared to MinFin 4), leading to
the period of negative γ1. Then, in late 1996, after Yeltsin’s election, the
market accepts these improvements as more permanent, and the MinFin 3
aligns with the MinFin 4. An altogether dierent, non-credit-based, inter-
pretation is that investor euphoria about Russia rst showed up in the prices
of MinFin 3’s in early 1996, perhaps because of ownership distribution or
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clientele eects. It is also possible that the idiosyncratic factors are driven
by model misspecication, or perhaps dierences in the degree to which these
bonds are on special in repo markets. The fact that γ1 and γ2 are somewhat
negatively correlated suggests that it might be desirable to have an addi-
tional factor for the (benchmark) spread model to describe the slope of the
term structure of spreads.
Another way of looking at dierences in spreads is to consider the ratios
of the short spreads associated with dierent bonds. For instance, the ratio
between the MinFin 3 short spread and the benchmark (MinFin 4) short
spread is:
s+ γ1
s
=
hMinFin 3LMinFin 3 + lMinFin 3
hMinFin 4LMinFin 4 + lMinFin 4
: (17)
If illiquidity is not priced or is a relatively unimportant factor in the volatility
of s + γ1 (that is, lMinFin 3  lMinFin 4  0), then the ratios of instantaneous
spreads can be interpreted as ratios of risk-neutralmean loss rates (within our
recovery-of-market-value framework). If, in addition, these two bonds expe-
rience credit events at the same times, then their risk-neutral default arrival
intensities are identical and, hence, the ratio (17) is the ratio of the respective
risk-neutral expected fractional losses at default, LMinFin 3=LMinFin 4.
Figure 8 shows the tted ratios (17) for the MinFin 3 and 5, omitting
the period during which the levels of the s + γi were close to zero. Under
the last interpretation, we see that the relatively \rich" pricing of MinFin
3 compared to MinFin 4 during 1996 and the rst half of 1997 could be
attributed to lower expected loss at default on the MinFin 3 (about 80%{90%
of the MinFin 4’s expected default loss). Along this line of interpretation, the
expected loss the MinFin 5 at default is approximately 110% of the MinFin
4’s expected loss in mid 1997, but the ratio drops to around 90% by the end
of 1997. Alternatively, if one assumes that the bonds have the same expected
fractional loss at default, then these spread ratios can be interpreted as the
ratios of the risk-neutral default intensities (hMinFin 3=hMinFin 4).
C. Analysis “Through the Default”
In this section, we investigate the properties of bond yields over our longer
sample period that includes the 1998 default. Using our model, we compute
investor’s expectations about the severity of the 1998 default. Given the
limitations of the available Russian data and the single default experience,
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Figure 8. Ratios of short spreads.
we are led to make several strong assumptions that help in solving important
identication and estimation problems. Therefore, we proceed in the spirit
of a \calibration" rather than with formal ML estimation.
In order to capture the features of data discussed in Section I.A, we shift
our focus to the extended pricing relation (4), allowing for uncertainty after
the credit event for the eventual write-downs. In this formulation, the risk-
neutral expected write-down, EQt (Yn), associated with the n
th credit event
may be bond-specic, so we would in principle need to consider an additional
state variables for each bond, at each of the NT credit events. In the case
of Russia, NT = 1, but this still leaves us with two state variables for each
bond yield (γi and E
Q
t (Y
i
n)), making it infeasible to invert the model for the
implied states.
To overcome this identication problem for our analysis of Russian Min-
Fins, we make the simplifying assumptions that (i) the MinFin 4 and MinFin
5 bonds have the same short spread in the post-default period; (ii) the risk-
neutral expected write-downs of these bonds are perfectly correlated; and
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(iii) as coupon payments are made, they reveal no information relevant to
risk-neutral conditional expected recoveries on subsequent coupons and prin-
cipals. We focus on the MinFin 4 and MinFin 5 bonds because the MinFin
3 matured in May, 1999. The rst assumption is largely consistent with
our pre-default analysis, where we found that these bonds had similar short
spreads (γMinFin 5 was small). The second assumption allows us to express
the expected write-down of MinFin 5 as an ane function, say , of the ex-
pected write-down of the MinFin 4, that is, EQt [Y
MinFin 5
1 ] = (E
Q
t [Y
MinFin 4
1 ]).
The ane function  is then determined by the following two conditions: (i)
(1) = 1, that is, if one of these bonds fully recovers, then so does the other,
and (ii)


bMinFin 4(8=21=1998)
bMinFin 4(8=7=1998)

=
bMinFin 5(8=21=1998)
bMinFin 5(8=7=1998)
;
where bi(t) denotes the price of bond i at time t. Condition (ii) is motivated
by supposing that the price drops observed in August 1998 reflected investor’s
expected write downs. Then we \observe" the expected write downs of Min-
Fins 4 and 5 at that time, and these \observations" imply the restriction on
 that is given by (ii).
With these assumptions, the prices of MinFin 4 and 5 are known functions
of their common short spread, st, and the expected write down, E
Q
t [Y
MinFin 4
1 ],
of MinFin 4. Hence, for each date we can compute the model-implied short
spread and risk-neutral expected write downs corresponding to the observed
prices by solving two equations with two unknowns. For simplicity, we hence-
forth denote Y MinFin 41 by Y .
Another consideration is the nature of the conditional risk-neutral ex-
pected write-down process U , dened by Ut = E
Q
t (Y ). The fact that U is
a risk-neutral martingale bounded between zero and one suggests a parame-
terization under which U is not stationary. For example, we could suppose
that
Ut = e
−z(T−t)(Zt − z) + z; (18)
where Z is the Jacobi diusion, dened by
dZt = 
z(z − Zt) dt+ z
p
Zt(1− Zt) d ~W zt ; (19)
and where ~W z is a standard Brownian motion under Q. So long as 2zz >
(z)2 and 2z(1 − z) > (z)2, Zt has support (0; 1). Although Z has a
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risk-neutral stationary distribution,16 Ut is non-stationary through its de-
pendence on (T − t). Moreover, to construct the likelihood of the data, we
need the actual conditional density of Zt. This density might reasonably
be assumed to depend on (rt; vt; st) under the actual probability measure,
in contrast to the parameterization (18)-(19). (Recall that, for pricing, we
assume independent recovery only under the risk-neutral measure Q.)
Rather than attempting to parametrically model the (conditional) depen-
dencies among (rt; vt; st; Nt; Zt) with our limited data, we instead proceed to
\calibrate"  to the data by maximizing the \loss" function
CL(c; b;  ^; ) =
 −1Y
t=1
p(st jX(1)t−1; vt; rt;)p(γt j γt−1;)
1
j detDHs(X(1)t )j


 TY
t=
p(st jX(1)t−1; vt; rt;)
1
j detDHs;Z(Xt)j

: (20)
The loss function (20) is obtained from the actual likelihood function by
leaving out all terms involving p(N) and p(Y ).17 This choice is motivated
by its close resemblence to the partial likelihood function for  obtained
under the additional assumption of Independent Recovery under the actual
probability measure.18 The latter would be an even stronger assumption
than we have made for pricing, so we view CL as a calibration function and
not a likelihood function.
We use weekly data on MinFins 3{5 from February 4, 1994 until August
7, 1998, and weekly data on MinFins 4{5 from August 21, 1998 through
September 8, 2000. The estimated parameters in column three of Table II are
relatively similar to those estimated using pre-default data only. A notable
dierence is that the estimate of the volatility, ss, of the short spread is
much larger in the full sample.
C.1. Model-Implied Short Spread and Write-Down
Figure 9 shows the implied short spread s over the full sample period. This
spread seems to be more volatile after the 1998 crisis than before. If true,
this would be inconsistent with the stationarity assumption underlying our
econometric analysis. The rst large upward spike in s occurs shortly after
1998 credit event, while the second spike occurs around the time of the 1999
dividend payments and the default on MinFin 3 (May, 1999). Interestingly,
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the market prices of the MinFins 4 and 5 do not change substantially around
the time of the second spike in s, an observation to which we will return.
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Figure 9. Short spread on the “expected payment” of the MinFin 4.
Figure 10 shows the model-implied expected write-downs of the MinFin
4 and MinFin 5 bonds. We see that the expected write-downs increase dra-
matically starting in early 1999. Hence, the model implies that investors
became more optimistic about the consequences of the 1998 event through
1999 and 2000. The rising optimism coincided with such favorable economic
developments as increased Russian protability, an improved trade balance,
and rising energy prices (see Section A), and by a seemingly higher than
expected willingness of the Russian government to make interest payments.
For example, in May 1999 when Russia decided to pay interest on the Min-
Fins, a Paribas analyst stated \It was a positive surprise | no one expected
to get any money in May," and an analyst at Lehman Brothers said: \This is
clearly good news. And it runs contrary to the belief in the market that the
threes, fours, and ves would be restructured" (The Russia Journal, Issue
15).
32
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
MinFin 4
MinFin 5
1/13/1995
12/29/1995
12/13/1996
11/28/1997
11/13/1998
10/29/1999
10/13/2000
E
x
p
ec
te
d
w
ri
te
-d
ow
n
(%
)
Figure 10. Model-implied risk-neutral conditional expected write downs, MinFin 4
and MinFin 5 bonds.
D. Pricing Out-of-Sample Bonds
Figures 11 and 12 show the market and model-implied prices of two Russian
bonds that were not used in estimation, MinFin 6 and Euro-01 (see Table I
for contract terms).19 We see that the model prices that are based on the
pre-default and full-sample parameters, respectively, are similar, which is
perhaps not surprising since the parameters are similar. Hence, we focus on
the dierences between model prices and observed prices.
The models t the MinFin 6 well until the credit event of August, 1998.
This means that the market did not dierentiate between the MinFins 4 and
6 during this time period. Immediately after the crisis, the model marginally
underprices the MinFin 6. This underpricing increases dramatically in the
week of 4/23/1999. On 4/20/1999, First Deputy Finance Minister Mikhail
Kasyanov made clear that Soviet-era debt would take much lower priority
than post-Soviet debt and that, with regard to the MinFins, Issues 3 through
5 were considered Soviet-era, while Issues 6 and 7 were considered post-Soviet
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Figure 11. Empirical and model-
implied prices of MinFin 6.
Figure 12. Empirical and model-
implied prices of Euro-01.
debts (The Russia Journal, Issue 13). Kasyanov further stated that Russia
would not pay the principal on MinFin 3 at its due date 5/14/99, but rather
would postpone the payment. Consistent with these observations, MinFin 6
becomes \rich" relative to prices based on the MinFin 4 model.
Recall that the prices of MinFins 4 and 5 did not change substantially
around these announcements. The relative stability of their prices seems to
reflect two countervailing forces: (i) heightened fears of future credit events
for \Soviet-era" MinFins raised the short spread s, and (ii) improving eco-
nomic conditions in Russia increased expected redemption values relative to
the more pessimistic expectations at the time of the August, 1998 default.
Euro-01 consistently traded at prices around or above the model-implied
prices, suggesting that market participants have always viewed the Russian
Eurodollar bonds as at least as good or better than the MinFins. The model-
implied prices of this Eurobond are lower than the observed prices prior to
September 1997, match relatively well the observed prices from September
1997 until August, 1998, and are substantially lower than Eurobond prices af-
ter August, 1998. This is consistent with changing market perceptions of the
relative likelihoods that Russia would default on (i) its global debt only, or
(ii) its internal debt only. MinFin bonds are considered domestic bonds and
are partly held by residents of Russia, whereas Eurobonds are global bonds
held abroad. Russia may be viewed as more likely to default on internal debt
when the country as a whole is productive and needs a good relationship
with other countries in order to attract capital and encourage trade. Russia
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may be viewed as more likely to default on external debt when the country
is doing so poorly that it is unlikely to attract much capital anyway, and the
government may decide that making payments to residents is more important
than to foreign institutions. Also, political favors can be particularly impor-
tant in such poor times. After Yeltsin’s victory in 1996 and until September
1997, there was a high degree of condence in Russia’s political stability and
economy. This is perhaps why investors expected case (ii) to be the more
likely scenario, therefore causing Eurobonds to trade at lower spreads than
MinFins. When the Russian economy’s problems mounted in late 1997 and
1998, investors re-evaluated the Russian risk | they became unsure about
whether case (i) or case (ii) was more likely. This story is consistent with
the fact that MinFins and Eurobonds were trading at similar spreads during
this period. In August, 1998, Russia defaulted on its Ruble-denominated
Treasuries. This, according to this story, convinced investors that case (ii)
was the more likey one, and MinFin prices dropped more severely than did
Eurobond prices.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of this theorem uses standard techniques and is only sketched.
The discounted gain process is
Gt = −
Z t
0
e−
∫ v
0
ru dulvPv dv +
Z t
0
e−
∫ v
0
ru duWNvPv− dNv + e
− ∫ t
0
ru duPt:
The rst term is the discounted costs of illiquidity. The second term is
the discounted cash flows generated at the times of credit events, which are
the times at which N jumps by 1. The third term is the discounted price.
With the proposed price process P stated in the theorem, the nal price is
PT = X
Q
nN(T ) Yn, as required. After an application of Ito^’s Formula, as in
Due and Singleton (1999), the discounted gain process is a Q-martingale,
using the fact that Nt −
R t
0
hu du is a Q-martingale. These properties of P
and G are necessary, from the denition of Q as an equivalent martingale
measure, for P to be the price process. There is a unique price process with
this property, as explained in Due and Singleton (1999).
Appendix B: Transition Density
In this appendix, we derive an approximation of the transition density of an
ane diusion of the form20 X = (XI ; XD) 2 Rn+Rm, where XI is an ane
vector process driving the volatility, in the sense that X solves the stochastic
dierential equation:
dXIt =
(
kI −KIIXIt

dt+
q
(XIt ) dW
I
t ;
dXDt =
(
kD −KDIXIt −KDDXDt

dt+
q
(D +BDIXIt ) dW
D
t ;
where (x) denotes a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the
respective elements of the vector x, and where (W I ;WD) is a standard
Brownian motion in Rn  Rm. We wish to evaluate the transition density
p(X
 X0), where  is the time between consecutive observations. We take
advantage of Bayes’ Rule, and the fact that XI is itself a Markov process, to
obtain
p(X
 Y0) = p(XI  X0) p(XD  X0; XI )
= p(XI
 XI0 ) p(XD  X0; XI ): (21)
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Our method is based on the assumption that the matrix KII is diagonal,
or equivalently that the elements of XI are independent. In our two-factor
model of the riskless term structure, this assumption is trivially satised,
since XI is the one-dimensional process v. If n > 1, however, this inde-
pendence assumption represents a restriction on the state process that, if
violated, means that the transition density of XI is not known in closed
form. Under this independence assumption, the conditional distribution of
XI given X
I
0 is a product of non-central chi-squares (Feller (1951)), with a
density given by
p(XI
 XI0 ) = Y
i2I
p(X i
 X i0); (22)
where
p(X i
 X i0) = cieci(Xiδ+e−KiiδXi0)

X i
e−KiiX i0
qi=2
(23)
Iqi

2ci
(
X iX
i
0e
−Kii1=2 ; (24)
with ci = 2Kii
(
1− e−Kii−1, qi = 2ki−1, and Iq denotes the modied Bessel
function of the rst kind of order q.
There is no known explicit expression for p(XD
 X0; XI ). We base an
approximation on the following observation: The distribution of XD condi-
tional on XD0 and the entire path of X
I from time 0 to time  has a known
normal density
p(XD
 X0; fXIs ; s 2 [0; ]g) = ’(XD ; m; V); (25)
where ’(  ; m; V ) is the density of a normal with mean m and variance V ,
’(x;m; V ) =
(
(2)N j det(V )j− 12 e− 12 (x−m)>V −1(x−m); (26)
and
m = e
−KDD
Z 
0
eK
DDs(kD −KDIXIs ) ds+XD0

(27)
V = e
−KDD
Z 
0
eK
DDs(D +BDIXIs )e
KDD
>
s ds

e−K
DD>: (28)
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Hence, by the law of iterated expectations,
p(yD
 X0; XI ) = E (p(yD  X0; XIs ; s 2 [0; ])  Y0; Y I  (29)
= E
(
’(yD ; m; V)
 X0; XI  : (30)
Thus, completing the specication of the conditional density function of the
state amounts to approximating the expectation in (30). We can approximate
p(   X0; XI ) as the conditional density of XD given XI , evaluated at an
outcome of the path of XI that is linear between XI0 and X
I
 . We have found
this approximation to be tractable and accurate for our application, as is
shown below.
We can approximate the expectation in (30) with arbitrary accuracy,
however, at the expense of some tractability. This can be done by simulating
the path of XI conditional on its starting point, XI0 , and its endpoint, X
I
 .
In particular, we divide the interval [0; ] into J sub-intervals, and let XJ
be the piecewise-linear approximation to XI corresponding to this division
of the interval. (We could use other interpolation schemes.) We dene mJ
and V J similarly to m and V , respectively, but with XI replaced with XJ .
This is like approximating the integrals in (27) and (28) with Riemann sums.
Hence, we have (a.s.) that (mJ ; V
J
 )! (m; V), as J !1. Using this result
as well as dominated convergence, under technical regularity21 we have
p(yD
 X0; XI ) = E (’(yD ; m; V)  X0; XI  (31)
= E

lim
J!1
’(yD ; m
J
 ; V
J
 )
 X0; XI

(32)
= lim
J!1
E
(
’(yD ; m
J
 ; V
J
 )
 X0; XI  (33)
= lim
J!1
pJ(yD
 X0; XI ); (34)
where pJ is dened by the last equation. This gives us a sequence, fpJg, of
approximations to the density, that converges to the true density. The J ’th
approximation, pJ , can be computed by Monte Carlo integration:
pJ(yD
 X0; XI ) = lim
Z!1
1
Z
ZX
z=1
’(yD ; m
J;z
 ; V
J;z
 ); (35)
where (XJ;z)z=1;2;::: are independent simulations of (X
I
0 ; X
I
=J ; : : : ; X
I
 ), drawn
from their joint conditional distribution given XI0 and X
I
 . We take m
J;z and
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V J;z to be the corresponding mean and variance, based on linear interpola-
tions. We can compute mJ;z and V J;z explicitly since we need only compute
integrals of exponentials. We know the transition densities of XI in closed
form, but simulating from this density is not trivial. Instead, we can sim-
ulate from another (possibly incorrect) density for XJ;z, say f^(  ), and use
\importance sampling" to compute pJ as
pJ(yD
 X0; XI ) = lim
Z!1
ZX
z=1
’(yD ; m
J;z
 ; V
J;z
 )w
z;Z ; (36)
where (XJ;z)z=1;2;::: are independent draws from f^(  ), f(  ) denotes the true
density of (XI0 ; X
I
=J ; : : : ; X
I
 ) conditional on X
I
0 and X
I
 , and
wz;Z =
f(XJ;z)=f^(XJ;z)PZ
l=1 f(X
J;l)=f^(XJ;l)
: (37)
The rst-order (J = 1) density approximation p1 does not require sim-
ulation, since it is based on the (linear) interpolation between XI0 and X
I
 .
Next, we consider the accuracy of this approximation for our application.
Accuracy of Approximation
To assess the accuracy of our approximation, we compute pi( y2
 X10 ; X20 ; X1 )
over a range of values of y2 , for i = 1; 2; 3; 6. We use the parameter estimates
from our 2-factor swap model with the state space rotated to make  diag-
onal. We x X10 and X
2
0 at their long-run means, X
1
 at its long-run mean
plus its weekly standard deviation, and let  correspond to a weekly time
step. The density approximations are computed using (36) with 40,000 sim-
ulations. (Computing p1 does not require simulation.)
Figure 13 shows that the resulting rst- and sixth- order approximate
conditional densities are virtually on top of each other. Also displayed is
104 times the dierence between p1 and p2. This dierence is partly due
to approximation errors (related to p1), and partly due to simulation noise
related to p6. The corresponding results for the logarithm of the conditional
densities are displayed in Figure 14.
Table III presents 104 times the average dierences between pi and p6 for
i = 1; 2; 3, over the range plotted in Figures 13 and 14. These dierences
are small both in absolute and relative terms, and both for densities and
log-densities.
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Figure 13. The first-order approxi-
mation, p1(   X0; XIδ ), to the condi-
tional density, the 6th order approxima-
tion, p6(   X0; XIδ ), and 104 times their
difference.
Figure 14. The first-order approxi-
mation, log(p1(   X0; XIδ )), to the log-
conditional density, the 6th order approx-
imation, log(p6(   X0; XIδ )), and 104
times their difference.
i j pi − p6 j j pi−p6 j
p6
j log(pi)− log(p6)j j log(pi)−log(p6)jj log(p6)j
1 0:0067 1:0492 1:0493 0:1405
2 0:0065 0:6289 0:6289 0:0990
3 0:0060 0:5913 0:5913 0:0918
Table III: The first column is 104 times the average absolute differences between the
density approximation, pi, of order i and that of order 6. The second column shows 104
times the average absolute relative differences. The third and fourth columns present the
same information for the log-densities (also multiplied by 104).
Appendix C: Risk-Free Parameters
The estimates of the parameters for the reference model are reported in
Table IV. We note that all22 parameters are signicant at the 5% level.
We also note that the standard deviations computed using the rst and
second derivatives are similar, indicating that the asymptotic analysis may
be appropriate.
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est. SD1 SD2
Kvv 0:0047 (0:0030) (0:0021)
Krv −0:0268 (0:0078) (0:0109)
Krr 0:3384 (0:1378) (0:1548)
v 107:4039 ( | ) ( | )
r 5:6800 ( | ) ( | )
rv 0:0436 (0:0126) (0:0145)
rr 0:1145 (0:0353) (0:0249)
v 0:0000 ( | ) ( | )
r −0:0764 (0:0372) (0:0412)
Table IV: The first column contains the estimates. The second and third columns con-
tains standard deviations estimated using first (SD1) and second (SD2) derivatives, re-
spectively.
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Notes
1GKOs are Ruble-denominated, short-term discount bonds and OFZs are
longer-dated coupon bonds issued by the Russian Treasury. In mid 1998,
Russia’s Treasury debt had reached $70 billion, of which about one third was
held by nonresident investors (IMF (1998)).
2Additive errors were assumed in the studies by Chen and Scott (1993),
Due and Singleton (1997), and Duee (1999), among others. In its most
general form, our modeling framework is agnostic about the determinants of
the bond-specic factors. In circumstances for which a researcher has data on
issuer-specic or macro-economic variables that are useful for distinguishing
among various credit and liquidity components of sovereign spreads, then it
may be possible to identify bond-specic components for each bond rather,
as we do here, focus on spreads relative to a benchmark bond.
3 Liu, Pan, and Pedersen (1997) propose a closed-from approximation to
the likelihood function of a general ane jump-diusion, Ait-Sahalia (1999)
oers closed-from approximations to the likelihood function of a generic one-
dimensional diusion, and Pedersen (1995) derives a simulation-based ap-
proximation to the likelihood function of a generic diusion (see also Brandt
and Santa-Clara (1999)).
4The assumption that the volatility of each component of XIt is an ane
transformation of the square-root of itself is essentially without loss of gen-
erality in ane diusion models. As will be made precise subsequently, it is
the independence assumption that leads us to lose generality by ruling out
feedback among the components of XIt through their drifts.
5An exception is Keswani (1999), who applies the model of Longsta and
Schwartz (1995) to Brady bonds.
6The short-rate process, r, is a predictable process with
R t
0
jrsj ds < 1
a.s., and EQ
h
exp(− R t
0
rs ds)
i
<1 for all t. See Protter (1990) for denitions
not provided here.
7An intensity process h for N is dened by the fact that h is non-negative
and predictable, and by the key property that Nt −
R t
0
hs ds denes a mar-
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tingale under Q.
8Here, Yn and Wn are random variables with outcomes in [0; 1] that are
measurable with respect to Fmax(n;T ), where n = infft : Nt  ng.
9Specically, L is a predictable process such that for each n 2 N, L =
EQ(1− Yn −Wn
 F−) where  is the stopping time  = infft : Nt  ng.
Dellacherie and Meyer (1978) show that such a process exists. (See Due
(1998) for further details on this construction in a default setting.)
10That is, VtNt = 0 almost surely for all t. From its denition, V
cannot ever jump if R and Z are measurable with respect to an observable
diusion process, as in our later parametric model. We could relax this and
obtain our pricing formula with a doubly-stochastic model, under which the
counting process N is, conditional on a sub-ltration to which h is adapted,
Poisson.
11That is, we specify that, under Q, ~W v;rt is a standard Brownian motion
in <2.
12See, for example, Chen and Scott (1993), Pearson and Sun (1994), and
Due and Singleton (1997). In ane models, the prices of zero-coupon bonds
are exponential-ane functions of the state variable (Due and Kan (1996))
with easily computed coecients. Further, the yields on coupon bonds are
simple functions of the zero-coupon prices, so g is known in closed-form up
to the solution of certain ordinary dierential equations underlying the zero-
coupon pricing.
13That is, we rst x r at the historical mean of the one-year treasury
yield between 2/1/1962 and 7/9/1999 (which is 6:82%), then estimate the
model and compute the sample mean of the implied short rate to be 5:68%,
and nally we x r at this level and re-estimate. The estimates obtained
in the last stage are very similar to those from the preceding stage, and the
sample mean of the implied short rate remains 5:68%.
14This representation (11) is equivalent to assuming that s is an ane
function of a trivariate state vector (r; v; ) that is an ane diusion with
(possibly) correlated components. Additional state variables that drive s,
but not r directly, can be accommodated. Given, however, our limited sam-
ple size and the fact that we are allowing for each bond spread to have an
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idiosyncratic component, we proceed with this parsimonious representation.
15More precisely, using Bayes’ Rule, p(c; b; ; ) can be expressed as
p(c; )
Y
t
p(st; γt
 vt−1; rt−1; st−1; γt−1; vt; rt; ; ) 1j detDs;γHj ;
so we estimate  by maximizing the partial likelihood function
^ = argmax

Y
t
p(st; γt
 v ˆt−1; r ˆt−1; st−1; γt−1; v ˆt ; r ˆt ;  ^; ) 1j detDs;γHj :
16 It can be seen that the stationary distribution of Z is Beta, with form
parameters 2zz=(z)2 and 2z(1 − z)=(z)2. At the time,  , of a credit
event, we can suppose that Z is drawn from this stationary distribution.
17LettingX 0t = (rt; vt; st; Nt; Zt) denote the state vector andX
(1)0
t  (rt; vt; st; Nt),
the likelihood of the data, over the pre- and post-default periods, is
p(c; b; N ;  ^; ; ) = p(c;  ^)

 −1Y
t=1
p(st jX(1)t−1; vt; rt;)p(Nt jNt−1; st−1; st)p(γt j γt−1;)
1
j detDHs(X(1)t )j


 TY
t=
p(st jX(1)t−1; vt; rt;)p(Nt jNt−1; st−1; st)p(Zt jXt−1; X(1)t ; )
 1j detDHs;Z(Xt)j

;
where  is the time of the credit event, γ is (as before) the vector of bond-
specic spread factors for the pre-default period, and H(r t ; v
 
t ; st; Nt; Zt;)
is the model counterpart to the observed price vector bt.
18By partial likelihood function we mean the portion of the log-likelihood
function that is relevant for estimation of . Independent Recovery under
the actual measure allows us to write p(Zt jXt−1; X(1)t ; ) as p(Zt jZt−1; ).
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Though, in this case, it would be reasonable to assume that  and  are not
functionally related, this strong independence condition is not sucient to
interpret (20) as the partial likelihood function. The reason is that the state
variable Z inverted from the pricing model would depend indirectly on 
and, hence, so would p(Zt ; jZt−1; ).
19 The model prices of the out-of-sample bonds are computed as follows.
First, we take the write down of each out-of-sample bond to be equal to the
write down of the benchmark bond (MinFin 4). Second, we take the short
spread of an out-of-sample bond to be a convex combination of the short
spreads of the two in-sample bonds with the nearest maturity. The weight
of each in-sample bond in the convex combination depends linearly on the
closeness in maturity.
20Under regularity, most of the ane diusions studied in the literature
on dynamic term structure models can be transformed to this form. See Dai
and Singleton (2000).
21When D > 0, V J is bounded away from zero and dominated convergence
is immediate. Otherwise, it may be shown under regularity.
22The parameter Kvv is signicant when we use the standard error com-
puted using the second derivative, but not with that computed using the rst
derivative.
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